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Regulation Q and the Stance ot Monetary Pol107 
The incr�sing importance assigned to monetary 
policy in recent years has brought to the tore 
the problem of how to assess what the stance ot 
monetary policy is--let. alone what it should be. 
Milton Friedman (Newsweek, March 1 ,  1071) 
That Milton Friedman is correct in his assessment that monetary 
policy has retrieved its sense or respect and importance from the 
doldrums or the Thirties and Forties must surely be readi� apparent 
by now, even to the most compule1ve of Keynesiana. Today, it is 
generally agreed among moat economists that this revival in the 
tai.th ot the potency or monetary policy can moat nearly be pinpointed 
1 to the Federal Reserve-Treasqry Accord ot 1951. At that time, our 
Keynesian-inspired polic�akers in Washi.ngton were finally convinc�d 
by the Federal Reserve authorities that the advent of atead7 inflatioA 
in the immediate post World War II years was indeed. broadly based, 
gaining momentum, and quite predictably receptive to the Federal 
Reserve-Treasury•e continuing emphasis on "easy" monetary and fiscal 
policy implementation. In short, the usual post-war forecasts ot 
impending and inevitable economic recession were simply not to be. 
The prophets of doom had grossly miscalculated the indelible impression 
that the large-scale, Great Deprese1on unemployment had left imprinted 
on the conscience of AlllericBn societ1 �d had turther misjudged the 
great lengths to which our goveriuaont policymakers were dedicated to 
1 M:l.lton Friedman, "The Role ot M0Det&17·�07,• 6J!e£1can Econo!!d,o 
Review, LVIII (Maroh, 1068), P• l. 
• 
2 
assuring that no such calamity should happen again. The Emplo7J11ent 
Act ot 1946 advanced this determination and embodied ita spirit b7 
enumerating as public law the specific mandate to achieve and main-
2 tain "maximum employment, production, and purchasing, power." Having 
been given the charge to economic nirvana, the post-Depression de-
• 
nigration ot monetaey policy, combined with the continuing deliriu 
over Keynesian tiscal policy, aerVed to reintorce thia precipitate 
plunge into 1ntlation. Although criticism ot economic policy abated 
somewhat during the mild recession ot 1949, the onset ot the Korean 
War in 1950 provoked a new resurgence in economic activ1ty. Thia time 
intlation was given a double-barreled intusion as (l) consumers and 
business tj,rms crashed the markets to secure themselvea trom expecte4 
rationing controls while (2) government expenditures tor militaey 
3 preparedness increased markedl,)'. In the end, the Treasuey agreed that 
it could no longer combat a spiraling inflation while simultaneously 
pegging the interest rates on ita tinancial obligations at the aame 
range ot yields that had existed since the Depression. Furthermore, 
a Federal Reserve which stood ready to absorb an unlilllited issuance 
of Treasury debt must concomitantly replenish the money suppl)' and 
thereby torteit all signiticant opportunity it ai,ght have had to wield 
a restrictive intluence on the economy. Finally, atter a tew embarraa-
sing public controntations had taken place, a mutual agreement between 
4 
the Treasury and the Federal Reserve w�s consummated on March 41 1951. 
The dignity, potency, and freedom of tb' Federal Reserve was thereby 
• 
restored, while the feelings and anxl.eties of the Treasury were alao 
2 Lester v. Chandler, 1'he Economics o( Mone: and Bapking (New York, 
1969), P• 488 . 
3 
4 
Ibid., P• 491. 
Ibid., P• 492. 
• 
3 
assuaged to the point of at least saving faoe. Economic stability 
could now be pursued by both organizations. 
Reliance on monetary policy has been in aaoendance ever since. 
But With the beginning of the 1960•e, the Federal Reserve authorities. 
suddenly encountered yet another instance of an institutionally-pegged 
• 
interest rate inh:l.biting the effective operation of �onetary policy. 
In contrast to the debate over the Treasury•a pre-Accord interest 
rate, the relevant rates now surfacing, under the auspices of Regu-
lation Q,• were the ve� child of the Federal Reserve System itself. 
The Q rates had hardly raised a whimper since their inception in the 
Banking Act of 1933, but the highly inflationary conditions wrought 
by the Vietnam War years rapidly installed them as an important mone-
tary force to be reckoned with. Aa their influence was largely un-
precedented, the already difficult and imprecise task of measuring 
c·urrent monetary conditions and proposing the proper policy corrections 
was elevated to an even more complicated and uncertain dimension. 
It is the purpose of this paper (1) to trace the course of Regu-
lation Q from its initial legislation in 1933 up to 1970; (2) to explore 
the theoretical implications of its effect on the monetary sector; 
(3) to test the hypothesis that one of its historical effects on the 
monetary sector has been to distort financial investment opportunities, 
and finally, (4) to draw a few conclusions about its historical record 
and to proffer some recommendations and/or admonishments with respect 
ieptly.apportioned according to these four general categories. 
•Regulation Q specifies a whole famil.7 of interest rates and ia not 
to be construed as appl)ring to any si.ngular interest rate • 
• 
PART I 
The Ba.nld.ng Act ot 1Q33 was a regrettably belated legislative 
measure bent on reforming the very structure of the American banking 
system, at that time in a virtual state of collapse from the ettecte 
ot three major banking crises (October, 1930; March, 1931; and March, 
1932) . 5 Although the provision tor the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation was unquestionably the "moat important structural change 
6 in the banking system" to emerge from this New Deal act, another• 
less tar-reaching aspect concerned the explicit prohibition on banks 
from paying any interest on demand deposits and rrom paying any rates 
ot interest on time deposits that �jould exceed those ceiling rates 
11apeci!ied by the Board ot Governors or the Federal Reaerve,S;yatem 
7 tor member banks and by the FDIC tor insured non-member banks.11 
Thia stricture ie what ia commonly referred to today as Regulation Q. 
It bears repeating he.;r;"e that Regulation Q is not actually any single 
interest rate whose dai.l;r fluctuations can be quoted in the Wall Street 
Journal . Rather, it is a regulation which apec11'1es a whole family 
or maximum interest rates that commercial bank.a ma;r pay on various 
categories or time deposits,• depending on length ot maturity . Ab-
solutel.y no interest payment ia allowed on demand deposits. 
5 Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, A Monetary History or the 
United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton, 1963), pp. 308-322. 
6 
7 
• 
Ibid., p .  434. 
Ibid. ,  P• 443 • 
Savings deposits at commercial banks are considered under Regulation 
Q aa just another category ot the tamil.7 of time deposits. See fable 1 
tor turther claritioation. • 
4 
5 
In 1Q33 the rationale supporting this strict limitation and control 
over the amoUAt of interest legally payable on bank depold.ts was alaoat 
unanimously grounded in the view that excessive interest rat• ooap._ 
tition had been one cause of the wholesale failure ot the banking 
sy�tem at that time. Presumably, the road to financial collapse DegaJl 
• 
With depos:l.t interest payments being steadily driven upward b7 co•peti• 
tive bidding, thus increasing both the bank•a operating coste and th• 
necessit7 to acquire ever more revenue earnings to cover these addi-
tional costs. The scenario continues with our aweaty-palmed banker 
now v•nturing quite relunctantly into the high-risk investment mark•t• 
in order to keep hie �nancial head above water. But such high-risk, 
long-term investments must necessarily impair bank liquidity; and 
finally the investments tail, driving the banker to insolvency and 
bankruptcy court. "Destructive rate competition" was to be avoided 
henceforth, and the enactment ot the Banking Act of 1933 would insure 
that at least this supposed caus• ot bank failures would be largel)' 
eliminated.8 The Federal Reserve Board set the initial maxi.mum rat•• 
on time and savings deposits at 3 percent. Most short-term market 
rates at that time were well below these legal ma.x:l.ma. The three-
month Trea&\U7 bill rate, for instance, averaged .53 percent tor all 
of 1933.9 In February of 1935 the Board acceded to a Federal Advisory 
Council recommendation that the c�iling rate be lowered to 2.5 percent. 
Reasoning here held that there were no investment opportu.nities existent 
which could even hope to ofter a return approaching the Fed's 3 percent 
// 
/ ! 8 / Charlotte 
�deral Reserve 
-- -
9
Ibid., P• 
E. Ruebling, "The Administration ot Regulation Q," 
Bank ot St. Louie Review (Februar7, 1970), P• 30. 
31. 
• 
6 
ceiling. Therefore, it was deemed "unwarranted" and without sufficient 
10 purpose. In January, 1936, the Fed officially distinguished among ti•• 
deposits or different maturity lengths for the first time, with the 
shortest durations given a l percent rate and successive higher durations 
1 1  given slightly higher rates on a graduated scale. I t  appears by tbia 
• 
policy action that the Fed had seen tit to incorporate a market-like 
spread or interest rate ceilings into the ban.king system, accordi.ng to 
the conventional market rate determinants of liquidity, risk, and )'ield. 
In short, it was making an institutional and rational response to tree 
market forces. 
The aforementioned alterations in Regulation Q were the last to 
be enacted until 1957-•an incredible twenty-one year span of dormancy 
by almost any measure. Throughout this period, market yields remained 
consistently below the Q ceilings, thus reinforcing the indifference in 
the financial world. The relative stability of both rates served to 
relegate the imposed Q rates to a virtual state or oblivion. A whole 
new generation of financial tycoons and government seers had long since 
been in residence, well versed in the economics or war and John Maynard 
Keynes, but barely conscious of Regulation Q, much less its potential 
impact upon the financial world. Few would have predicted the unsettling 
and highly distorting influence this regulation would exert on the 
vacillating monetary 91stem ot the. Sixties. 
In mid-year 1955, short-term interest rates rose above the Regulation 
Q ceilings tor the very first time and in January of 1957 (see Chart 1 � ,p. 8-), 
the Federal Reserve Board finally ended .the near impregnable statue ot 
regulated bank deposit interest rates by raising the mald.Jaua ce111.ng 
lOibid. 
11 Ibid. 
7 
to 3 percent. As Chart 1 indicctes, the rates on prime tour-to-six 
month commercial paper and three-month treasury bills had risen to 
average respective levels of 3.41 percent and 2.61 perceDt by the end 
of 1956 while the bank rates languished at their 1936 graduated ceiling 
1 2  levels, the legal r11ax1mum still residing at 2.5 percent • 
• 
Perhaps the most conspicuous outgrowth of the 1957 policy shift 
was the change in reasoning behind this move, as reflected in the 
majority opinion or the Federal Reserve Board. Whereas the Great 
Depression years elicited a rationale or preventing "destructive rate 
competition, " the new strategy now promulgated by the Fed was one of 
preventing "undue restriction on competition," the very antithesis of 
the Depressi.on conventional wisdom . The failure of commercial banka 
to otter competitive rates was reflected in the Fed's official poa1t1oR 
that: 
• • • • there was insufficient reason to prevent 
banks , in the exercise ot management discretion, 
from competing actively for time and savings bal­
ances by ottering rates more nearly in line with 
other market rates . By increasing the rate limita­
tions only on savings deposits and on time deposits 
with maturities longer than 90 days, the Board 
continued to recognize the special thrift character 
ot savings accounts and to preserve a differential 
between longer-term time deposits and short-term 
time depof3ts representing essentially liquid 
balances. . 
It is interesting to note t�t Federal Reserve Board Governor 
Robertson rendered the only dissenting opinion. Governor Robertson 
argued the traditional, Depression-oriented position that raisi.ng 
interest rates would increase bank operating costs and thereby exert 
a potentially dangerous inducement on bankers to cover these new coate 
12Ibid., P• 34. 
13Ibid.1 P• 35 . 
• 
8 
Chart 1 
C..•rclll ''"' 0.1111 .. llt l2 
• 
• Soqrce: Federal Reserve Bank ot St. Louis Review (Apr:Ll, 1971), p. 6. 
\ 
,,j 
9 
by seek1.ng higher-yielding and, therefore, higher-risk assets in the 
open market. This tendency, Governor Robertson held, would weaken 
bank liquidity appreciably and f.lirt with financial insolvency un-
14 necessarily. In retrospect, we can safely discard Governor Robertson•• 
stand as unduly cautious and, in view ot FDIC protection and greater 
• 
monetary policy wisdom, probably unwarranted. In any case, the + per-
cent increase in 1957 can now be' viewed with almost humorous ineigniti-
cnnce when compared to the rapid-tire changes that have occurred in the 
Sixties. Governor Robertson remained adamant, though, in his monetary 
philosophy and was to write three more dissenting opinions concerning 
15 the seven rate changes concluded in the Sixties. 
The decade of the Sixties wi.tnessed the tull bloom ot Regulation Q 
as yet another monetary obstacle to contend with. Heretofore, a rather 
inobtrusive, almost forgotten facet ot monetary theory and policy, 
' 
Regulation Q acquired a measure ot attention that was quite inconsistent 
with its previous history. 
Mostly because of the incessant complaints from large New York 
banks , the Federal Reserve increased the maximum ceiling on time deposits 
from 3 to 4 percent in January of 1962 . The New York banks had urged 
this action in order that they might compete more effectively tor foreign 
tunds and prevent turther outflows ot funds from their banks.16 Domestic 
considerations, designed to enhance the attractiveness ot longer-term 
time deposits and to provide for greater competition for tunds, were 
also citad but were of a less prominent stature 1n the deciaion-mald.ng 
process. In October ot the same year, the Federal Reserve went turther 
1�. 
15Ib1d., pp. 32-33. 
16 Chandler, p. 528. 
10 
in appeasing the New York banks and catering to balance-of-payments 
considerations by abolishing all ceiling rates "paid on deposits ot 
17 toreign central banks and governments." 'l'hese two initial actions 
on Regulation Q rates were certainly the precursors ot new things to 
come, as tar aa the traditional distribution of the money supply and 
• 
"near money" types were concerned. For the steacl7 increase in ceiling 
rates throughout the Sixties would have the ettect ot vastly increasing 
the "domestic holdings of time and savings deposits at commercial 
banks. "1 8 
Beginning with its next change in rate ceilings in July of 1963• 
a largely unprecedented discussion and study of the possibl•.impact 
ot Regulation Q ma:hipulations was evident in economic and rinancial 
circles. The July change set the max1.mum rates on all, time depoaits 
held longer than 90 days at 4 percent. 'l'hua, while the maximum rate 
ot 4 percent was not changed trom the 1962 action, a larger arra:r ot 
time deposit categories could now be paid this maximum rate. The di� 
cussion alluded to above now took the form ot an academic debate over 
the potential influence of Regulation Q on the availability and growth 
ot total bank credit. Could discretionary shitts in these ceilings be 
dependable enough to serve as yet another "major tool ot monetaey 
19 stabilization policy?" 
In keeping with the seemingly inexorable climb in market interest 
rates, the Federal Reserve authorities telt compelled again in November 
ot 1964 to raise the ceiling on 90 day-or-longer time deposits up to 
4. 5 percent. Other time deposit categories were also shirted upwards 
17
Ibid. 
18Ibid. 
19 Ruebling, p. 37. 
11 
according to the Fed•a reasoning that t he upward adjustment was neceaaar,y 
to insure "a sufficient tlow ot tunds through banks -o finance domestic 
investment" and to prevent our balance-ot-payments situation trom 
20 deteriorating still turther. 
As the war-induced inflationary pressures began accelerating 
• 
rapidly in 1965, the ceiling rntes ot November 1964 soon became out-
moded. Market rates had continu'ed their steady climb upward and 
increasing credit demands were driving them still further· (see Chart 1). 
The Federal Reserve Board, sensing that a large run-ott ot bank time 
deposits toward the more attractive market instrWDents was in the otting. 
stepped in to bolster the bank's competitive position by raising the 
ceiling on all categories or t:1me deposits to 5. 5 percent, with only 
savings deposits remaining at the 4 percent level. This action, taken 
in December ot 1965, epitomized the Fed's basic proposition that the 
regulated rates must be kept in reasonable line with market rates in 
. 21 order to sustain an orderly growth and allocation ot credit. 
This rate structure was to please the Federal Reserve tor less 
than six months. By July ot 1966 inflationar,y conditions throughout 
the economy had reached such alarming proportions that the Fed had 
embarked on a restrictive monetary policy to stem the tide ot expanding 
bank credit and to thereby inhibit turther increases in total spending 
(GNP). This was the traditional.discretionar,y response to a demand-
pull inflation that the Fed had so auccesstully invoked on other occasions 
since the 1951 Accord. The Fed's actions were two-told: ( 1) the 
maximum rates on so-called multiple maturity deposits were lowered trom 
the 1965 5. 5 percent level to 5 percent and 4 percent depending on 
. • .  20Ibid,., P• 32 . 
21Ibid., P• 37. 
1 2  
length ot maturity (multiple maturity deposits are best, although not 
solely, distinguished from simple maturity time deposits as being 
"payable at the depositor's option on more than one daten)22 and 
(2) the Fed recommended to Congress that they be allowed to "distinguish 
deposits by amount in regulating rates." In short, this meant that 
• 
the Fed wished to differentiate legally between "consumer-type deposits 
. . 23 and money market CD's (certificates of deposit). " On September 26, 
1966 a law was passed by Congress permitting deposits ot less than 
$100,000 to be assigned a dif!arent rate by the Fed than those eclipsing 
that sum. The Fed promptly reduced single maturity sums of less than 
$100,000 to 5 percent while retaining the 5. 5 percent maximum ra�e tor 
those time deposits exceeding $100,000. As with the earlier July action, 
the Fed was mainly concerned that this reduction be enacted so that 
excessive competition for deposits would not cause further rate increases 
and thus fly in the face of its overall poUoy of "curbing the expansion 
ot bank credit.1124 
The last two actions that have emanated from the Federal Reserve 
Board concerning Regulation Q occurred in Apriltl968 and January,1970. 
The 1970 action created the ceiling structure that is presently in 
effect (see following table). Both actions were motivated by much the 
same reasoning involving conformity with the Fed's basic anti-inflationary 
policy, giving banks more "leeway to compete tor interest-:-aensitive funds," 
25 and to "bring ceilings more in line with market rates. " 'rhe 1Q68 action 
increased the maximum rate on Sl00, 000 denomi.Aation CD's to 6.2� percent 
22tbid. , p. 38. 
23Ibid. 
24Ibid. 
25Ibid. , p. 33. 
13 
on maturities exceeding six months. Shorter maturity lengths tor this 
same denomination were assigned rates or 6, 5.75, and 5.50 percent . 
The 1970 action boosted the ceiling rate on the largest CD's to 7. 5 
percent with savings deposits assuming the lowest maximum rate ot 4.5 
percent (See Table A). This rather dramatic upward revision in the 
• 
ceiling structure reflected the Fed's belated attempt; to rectify the 
consequences of the d1sintermed1ation crisis of the previous year and, 
therefore, to once again bring the ceiling rates into line wi.th the 
skyrocketing market rates. 
• 
TYpe Of Deposit 
14 
Table A 
• 
Yield Differentials 
(Percent Per Annum) 
Regulation Q 
Ceiling Rate 
Spread between Gov•t • 
Security Yield and 
Comparable Ceiling Rate 
(1) Savi.ngs deposits e 4.50 (30 days) 2.64 
(2) Other time deposits 
• 
• 
Multiple maturity 
30-89 days 4.50 (3 - mo.) 3. 57 
90 days or more 5.00 (6 - mo.) 3.11 
Single maturity 
Leas than s100,ooo 
30 days to l year 5.00 (6 - mo.) 3.11 
l year 5. 50 (12 - mo.) 2.53 
2 year 5.75 (2 - yrs. ) 2.40 
$100,000 or more 
30-59 days 6.25 (3 - mo.) 1.82 
60-89 days 6.so (3 - mo.) l.57 
90-17� days 6.75 (6 - mo.) 1.36 
180 days to l year 7.00 (12 - mo.) l.03 
l year or more 7.50 (12 - mo.) o. 53 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank ot'St. Loui.s Ravi.aw (February, 1970), p. 29 • 
Savings deposits have no contractual stipulations regarding maturity or 
withdrawal notices, although the bank may requi.re 30 days notice prior 
to withdrawal. 
Part II 
• 
Judging from th• rather hectic and capricious history ot Regula­
tion Q, it seems abundantly clea'r that the Federal Reserve policymaker•, 
are much concerned over how the current str�cture ot Regulation Q 
accoldllO:d.ettes the goals ot their monetary game plan. It is important then 
that one commands at least an adequate understanding of the theoretioal 
impact of Regulation Q on monetary policy. 
As the most recent historical evidence has shown, the Fed's 
primary responsibility to the banking system has manifested itself in 
1te attempt to keep the legal ceiling rates on bank time deposits on a 
competitive level with its unregulated market counterparts� As we 
have seen, th:Ls very praiseworthy goal has not always been attained-­
usually when the Fed was tardy in offsetting sudden upward shifts in 
market rates, for whatever reason. 
The crwr: ot Regulation Q's future manifestation in the financial 
sector turns on the interpretative vagaries ot the Federal Reserve Sys­
tem• s Board of Governors as to which of the two monetary indicators 
are in most esteem at present. Specifically, the dilemma in implement­
ing Regulation Q revolves around whether interest rates (and money mar­
ket conditions in general) or the money supply should serve as the main 
guideline to monetary policy. UntortunateJ.y, an overzealous or prefer­
ential pursuit of one ot these indicators can sometimes be accomplished 
only at the expense ot the other. 
15 
16 
In any caae1 we have seen from its history that the unfavorable 
side of Regulation Q emerges when open market interest rates are Big-
niticantly higher than those legally prescribed rates offered by banks. 
When this situation does occur, investors are understandably motivated 
to withdraw funds from their banki time depos1.te and reinvest in the 
• 
more profitable market instruments. When this shift in tunds is sue-
tained over any considerable span ot time (several months at least), con-
siderable caution must then be exercised in deriving any conclusive 
policy decision tor the future with respect to the money supply since 
the component parts ot the money supply, broadly defined, will be ia a 
state ot flux. In short, an operative definition ot just what conat�tutea 
the money supply in these times becomes a moat vezing and intE'i.gaing 
problem ot measurement. 
As we have seen, this contusion and anxiety among poU�ymakers 
arises when they must define the money supply tor indicator eatima-
tion purposes. The money supply, defined narrowly as d•mand deposits 
plus currency held by the public, is called M1• Defined broadly", we add 
time deposi.ts a� commercial banks to the M1. componente. f!d.s detini• 
tion is called M2" Even more expansive definitions ot the money supply 
CM3or M4) have been suggested which include deposits at mutual savings 
26 
and loan associations, and other sutt1cientl.y liqu1.d "near-moneys." 
This broader definition (tocus1.n� on M2;only) will shrink gradually in 
magnitude as the more desirable market instr\Ullents lure funds away 
from the banks. Thus, the time deposit component declines 1n deference 
to the more competitive market opportunities, and the M2 magnitude as 
26 Chandler, p. 12. 
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a whole is reduced. Ot course, we have implicitly assumed that all 
funds available tor investment will actually be invested. In times of 
great uncertainty this may not be the case. Under these circwnstancea, 
the investor may choose to place all or, more likely, part ot hi$ interest-
bearing funds in a bank demand deposit account, knowing tull well that 
• 
absolute liqui.dity is their only Virtue. The M1 def:l.nition will increase 
somewhat as a result. The reverse process, called reintermediation, 
occurs when market rates tall below the Q ceilings and time deposits 
are replenished. 
The paradox of this divergence in the M1 and M2 money supply 
definitions is that they have historically exhibited a strong positive 
correlation. The common knowledge,of this relation is explained by the 
tact that the Regulation Q rate structure has rarely lost its competitive 
edge with respect to market rates. When market rates have risen sub-
stantially above Q rates, and the Federal Reserve does not-move to 
eliminate the discrepancy by raising the ceiling rates tor banks, then 
the policymakers are faced with the perplexing problem ot which money 
supply definition, if either, can be trusted as an accurate barometer ot 
the true monetary position in the economy. For example, an inclination 
to rely on the M1 measurement during a period of exceptionally high 
market rates might lull the policymaker into belieVing that monetary 
condi.tions are "easing," since M1 will probably increase slightly tor 
reasons ot uncertainty. On the other hand, the M2 magnitude will have 
borne the brunt ot this discrepancy, in the form or diaintermediation, 
and will decline. Perhaps the policymaker was wrong the first ti�e and 
cond1.tions are actually "tightening." The point is that when Regulation Q 
ia allowed to operate in such a fashion as to cause the monetary aggre-
gates M1 and M2 to elicit conflicting signals, the policymaker cannot be 
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certai.n of the true situation Yd.th any great conti�ence. Furthermore, 
we m�st not torget that the policymaker has yet to consider the simul-
taneous implications ot interest rates and other relevant ind1.catore in 
his forecast. The not so si.mple dilemma ot conflicting money supply 
definitions has now been replaced and compounded by a �ulti-taceted • 
set ot theoretically conflicting indicators. 
Thus, the already imprecise'task ot determining the "stance ot 
monetary policy" is strained even further when Regulation Q is left un-
tended. The M2 aggregate is particularly sensitive to money market 
cond1.tions and may dangerously exaggerate the true posture ot monetal"1 
cond1.tions when the forces ot d1s1ntermediation are strong. The M1 
aggregate may also distort the true scheme of things but probably to a 
leaser extent. By procrastinating then on an antiquated Regulation Q 
structure that is out ot line with higher market rates, the Federal 
Reserve Board or Governors succeeds only in obscuring and diminishi.ng 
its own capacity to make sound economic judgments. It is small con-
solation to know that the true monetary picture is undoubtedly "easier" 
than one ot the monetary aggregates but simultaneously "tighter" than 
the other. This distortion between monetary aggregates can, of course, 
be quite easily remedied. Theoretically, the Fed need only summon up 
the courage to abolish Regulation'Q. Both M1 and K2 will then exhibit 
quite similar and reliable behavior on which to base monetary polJ.cy, 
along with money market conditions. Until .then, they must monitor 
both but trust neither completely. 
A final word ot warning on the theol"1 behind Regulation Q is in 
order here. The potential adverse etfects from Regulation Q which I 
have described should not be construed as an absolute change in total 
credit in the econom1. Rather, the situation in which Regulation Q Gausea 
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a distorting effect on the financial sector implies a shirt in the allo-
cation or credit. Total available credit remains Wlchan�ed. Hence, when 
such a situation occurs, Reg\llation Q merely serves to convoy available 
credit between the banking system and the unreg\llated markets, leaving 
the total quantity of credit unchanged. Total credit shifts in the 
• 
economy receive their monetary influence mainly from the actions of the 
Fed's open market committee. Of course, such sharp wrenchinga in the 
allocation of credit sources are most certainly undesirable in them-
selves and should be kept to a minimum. Otherwise, unnecessary un-
certainties and instability in the financial sector are encouraged to 
our own detriment. 
Part III 
• 
Thus far, thi.s paper has dwelled upon the hi.story and theory 
of Regulation Q. It is now ti.me to present and.discuss the re-
sults ot a statistical exper1ment. which waa conducted to test 
the hypothesis that Regulation Q can, under certain circumstances, 
exert a ... distorting effect upon financial investment opportunities. 
Consequently, if and when this effect is operating, monetary policy-
makers must be extremely cautious in their interpretations of the 
meaning and raliability or the two money stock ind.1c1·tors, M1 and 
M2• In short, the 11stance of monetary policy" becomes increasingly 
more difficult to determine accurately when the behavior of Regu-
lation Q manifests itself adversely in the financial sector. 
The method used for testing this hypothesis is the stepwise 
multiple regression technique. Regression analysis is perhaps 
the most popular and most widely used statistical technique in all 
ot economics. The purpose of regression analysis is to "measure or 
estimate the relationships among economic variables which constitute 
. . 27 the essence Of economic theory and econold.c life. " Because Of its 
wide application as a tool helpful in the quei:it tor accurate economic 
predictions, its reputation has to a considerable extent outstripped 
its realistic capabilities in regards to its predictive powers. Let 
us clarify at the outset that the regression technique, like the � 
27W1lliam C� Merrill and Karl A. Fox, Introduction to Economic 
Statistics (New York, 1Q70), P• 321. 
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computer, which is frequently used to execute its mathematical opera-
tions, is no better than tho data or variables gathered before it. It 
performs the same function on any and all data and variables proffered 
to it and suitable !or analysis, irrespective of quality. Thua, even 
the moat diligent or human efforts and the collection and selection of 
• 
the higher;t grade or data and variables is still fraught, in all like-
lihood, with some degree of bias or error. The degree or bias or error 
is what we must endeavor to minimize and it is not an impossible task. 
The regression· method is performed on a aeries or data that are 
presented in equation form. The simple regression form of y • B0 + B1X1 
describes a situation in which the value or the dependent variable y ia 
estimated (or predicted) by the value or the single independent vari-
able x. The symbols B0 and B1 are, respectively, a constant and a re-
greasion coefficient. Multiple regression analysis differs !rom the 
simple regression algebraic !orm only in that more than one independent 
variable is used to estimate the dependent variable. The general form 
of this technique can be expressed as y = B0 + B1X1 + B2X2 + B3X3 + ••• 
•• + BftXn• Finally, stepwise multiple regression.merely refers to a 
computational procedure whereby the several independent variables are 
gener�ted into the equation one at a time, according to the strength 
I 
or significance or their influence on the dependent variable. Thus, the 
statistical results of a stepwise regression analysis wi.ll reveal that 
the =oat powerful independent variable is associated with Step l, the 
next most powerful independent variable with Step 2, and so on. In 
this manner, we can instantly read from our results which of our several 
independent variables is empirically the more accurate predictor ot the 
dependent variable. 
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Since the phenomenon of an active Regulation Q has only re-
cently emerged in the past decade, I have necessarily confined my 
testing to the only two time periods ot relevance--the "credit crunch" 
of 1966 and the disintermediation crisis of 1969. Only from these two 
episodes can any reasonable indictment of Regulation Q be submitted 
• 
tor empirical verification. Historical data tor the decade reveal to 
us at a glance that only in these two periods was there ever any evi• 
dence of significant shifts in investment tunda between regulated and 
unregulated opµortunities and therefore, only in these two periods can 
we reasonably hypothesize any supposed complicity on the part of 
Regulation Q. 
'l'he operational variables that I have chosen for this experiment1� 
in stepwise mulitple regression analysis consist or": { 1 )  the level 
in the outstanding Volume Of large {Sl00,000 or more), negotiable Cer-
titicates of deposit--tbe dependent variable, (2) the cal�ulated spread 
between the interest rate on a selected market instrument and the maxi-
mum ceiling rate allowable under Regulation Q--an independent variable, 
and (3) the money supply, detined narrowly as demand deposits plus 
currency held by the public--an independent variable. 
The outstanding volume of large, negotiable certificates of de-
posit {CD's) was chosen as the dependent variable because or its 
theoretical sensitivity to the competing interest rates of free mar-
ket instruments. Since large, negotiable CD's carry the highest rates 
permissible under Regulation Q, it was postulated that any observed 
shift of investment funds in the tace of an operative• Regulation Q 
would necessarily include fluctuations in this variable� Specitical]J, 
•By "operative," I am reterri.ng to a 81.tuation in which Regulati.oD 
Q is exerting a distorting effect on investment opportunities. 
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if the interest rates on competing market instruments are such in excess 
of the very highest regulated rates (thus making Regulation Q "operative"), 
we should logically expect a shift of funds away from the less remunera-
tive rogulated investments to the more attractive market instruments. 
The interest rates for two market instruments, prime 4-6 month commer-
• 
cial paper and Aaa corporate bonds, were selected as contrast to the 
maximum Regulation Q rate. The' calculated spread between one of these 
market ra.tes and the Q rate became our first independent variable. 
Both of 'the aforementioned market instruments are well-known investment 
opportunities and can be reasonably expected to attract a large portion 
of any suddenly available funds, the consequence of an operative Regu-
lation Q. The money supply M1 was included as a"second ::tndependent,vari.-
able on the logic that large fluctuations in its magnitude have been 
traditionally cited as a partial influence on the level of open market 
interest rates. That is to say, when the money supply experiences a 
large increase, it exerts an initial dampening effect on these market 
rates--at least in the short-run. The rationale behind this short-run 
effect is an economic concept of textbook :Lmportance. Simply said, it 
holds that people and institutions that are in posseosion of excess 
noninterest-bearing tunds (because of the hypothesized increase in the 
money supply) will surely invest'these funds into interest-bearing assets 
(ceteris paribus), i.e. , either·in market instruments or in bank t:Lme 
deposits in our model. Accordingly, this increased demand for interest-
bearing assets will, over the short-run, tend to raise their prices 
thereby reducing their rate of return. Thia is the short-run effect 
then which justifies the inclusion of the money supply in our equatioD1 
for it involves an acknowledged influence on t:ln&Dcial investment OP-
port uni ties. 
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Essentially, one basic model was constructed to represent a useful 
and appropriate test for discerning the true influence, if any, ot 
Regulation Q on the financial sector or the economy. Simple modi-
fications in the basic equation, in the form of alternating similar 
VQriables in the model, were also tested in order to insure a reason­
• 
able sense of confidence in the equation's general application. The 
basic form or the equation can be expressed algebraically as CD1s • 
Bo + B1SPRD + B2MON; where CD's refers to the level of the volume ot 
large, negotiable certificates of deposit, SPRD refers to the spread 
between the interest rate on a selected market instrument and the 
maximum Regulation Q rate prevailing, MON refers to the money supply 
(defined elsewhere as M1), and B0, B1, and B2 refer to the parameters 
to be estimated by the test. Two market interest rates, those on prime 
4-6 month commercial paper and corporate Aaa bonds, were incorporated 
separately into the model's SPRD variable in order to pro'vide a com-
pai-1.son between well known market instruments. No time lag was allowed 
for since a casual inspection of the dat� revealed that any observed 
shift in funds, due to an operative Regulation Q, were very rapid indeed. 
For this reason, it was felt that data collected on a quarterl� basis 
would probably be too broad an aggregate to satisfy the kind of sensi-
tivi.ty that the hypothesis implies. Therefore, a shorter time standard, 
monthly data, was chosen for thi.s experiment since it seemed more likely 
to embody and reflect the dynamics �f rapidly shifting tunds. 
Data for all the-ariables contained in this experiment, except 
Regulation Q rates, were obtained from assorted volumes of the Board 
or Governors-Federal Reserve Bulletin. Data on Regulation Q maxilllwa 
rates were taken from the February, 1970 issue ot the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis Review. 
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The statistical results generated from the stepwise multiple-re-
gression analysis of the above model are presented on the following 
pages. The reader might wish to reserve a tew minutes at this time 
to familiarize himself Vlith these results before pr9ceeding with this 
discussion. 
• 
The results conta:ined in Table 1 constitute an attempt to empiri-
cally verify the hypothesis about Regulation Q tor the 1969 crisis. 
Monthly data tor the thirty month period trom January ot 19e8 through 
June of 1970 were used. The market interest rate selected tor this 
model was the 4-6 month rate on prime commercial paper. 
The results from Table 1 appear to substantially corroborate the 
hypothesis that Regulation Q ceilings which are allowed to be aignifi-
cantly outstripped by market rates tend to elicit rapid shifts in in-
vestment funds. Step 1 pinpoints the SPRD variable as being the more 
powerful of the two independent variables in influencing'the change in 
CD•s. This supports the hypothesis since the spread between market 
rates and the maximum Regulation Q ceilings (the SPRD variable) was 
most pronounced during 1969. As expected, the sign or the regression 
coefficient for the SPRD variable was negative. The inverse relation 
between the volume ot outstanding CD's.and a high market rate proxy 
(commercial paper here) is presented graphically in Chart 2. The gap 
between the volumes ot commerci�l paper and CD's outstanding is obvious 
and reflects the sensitivity of CD's to the rates on higher competitive 
market instruments. With the inclusion of the money supply variable in 
2 Step 21 the R value (coefficient of multiple determination) attains a 
very respectable . 819. The expected negative sign of this variable 
was also indicated by the results. We would expect a policy of monetar,-
restriction, which was the case at this time, to have a stimulating 
Table 1 Results 
Step 1 • 
Step 2 
CD's = 20. 2106 - 3. 9336 SPRD 
c-a . 12g7 )• 
R2 = . 731 
1 F  - value = 76 . 2075 + 
Standard Error o f  Estimate = 2. 439 
CD' s  : 64 . 5641 - 2 . 8848 SPRD - 0. 2279 MON 
C -6 . 0472 ) •  (-3. sg43)• 
Increase in R2 = .088 (the increment to Step 1 
R2 value from addi.tion o f  Step 2 )  
F - value = 60. 7837+ 
Standard Error of Estimate = 2 . 043 
T-values are denoted by parenthesils 
•Indicates signi ficance at .01  level 
+Indi.cates significance at .001 level 
Durbin-Watson StatiGtic a 1.24 
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e ffect on marke t rates whi ch, when coupled w1.th an already strong demand 
tor credit in the private sector, should serve to aggravate the spread 
between market rates and Regulation Q ceilings . We shall return to the 
effects ot this policy in more detail shortly. 
All T-valuea in these two steps were found to be significant at 
• 
the .OJ level. The final F-value in Step 2 was a very healthy 60 . 7837 9 
signi ficant at the . 001 level and thus veri fying that our parameters 
are in fact si gnificantly different from zero . 
Table 2a turnishes a list ot the simple correlation coefficients 
tor each possible variable pairing in our model. The ma gnitude ot these 
coetricienta is or utmost importance since the problem or multicollinearity 
emerges here . Mulitcollinearity can be understood as the case where 
the independent variables are so hi ghly correlated to begin w1.th that 
their separate effects on the dependent variable cannot be easily dis-
tingui shed. This problem ot "high-intercorrelation between independent 
variables is particular).y: acute in the particlllar instances o r  economic 
28 time series. 11 An examination of the sir.�ple correlation coefficients 
tor the first model will expose any suspi ciously high correlations. 
Since the prospect o f  multicollinearity is only relevant with respect 
to the independent variables ,  we shall only be interested in the magni-
tude correlating this model' s independent variables--namely SPRD and MON. 
Table t a  identi ties this variable pair as 11 1 , 2 . 11 Its coefficient is 0. 612 . 
There is no statistical test that I know of whi ch can determine the im-
pllcationa of this magnitude . But past studi.es using the regression tech-
nique are generally in agreement that a much higher magnitude is required 
be fore suspicions of truly adverse multicollinearity are justi fied. Some 
multicollinearity is obviously in effect between this model ' s  two inde-
pendent variables,  but it i s  not ot an �nordinately acute nature. 
28Ibid . 9 P• 428 . 
. .  
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Table l a: Simple Correlation Coefficients 
VariabJ.e Pairs 
Variable = SPRD 
Variable 2 a MON 
Variable 3 = CD 
1 , 1  
1 , 2  
1,3 
2 , 2  
2 , 3 
3 ,3 
Simple 
Correlation Coefficients 
1. 000 
0.612 
-0. 8 5 5  
i . ooo 
-0 .756 
1 . 000 
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Another problem associated with re gression analysis models i s  that 
o� autocorrelation among successive residua ls. Autocorrelation some-
times occurs "due to the tact that most econonrl.o time series are charac-
29 t erized by suc cessive observations that are interdependent . "  Thus , 
autocorrelation can be understood as the problem where the observations 
• 
tor a variable over a time series are correlated to each other in a sort 
o t  cyclical pattern , in whi ch case we cannot be confident o t  the va lidity 
o t  our generated regress1.on coe fficient s .  The Durbin-Watson teat was 
(, appli ed to the residuals ot this experiment �� to determine i t  autocor-
relation exist s. As Chart 2 i llustr�.tes, this test leaves much to be 
desired also , as far as pre cision of i ts out come i s  concerned. By way 
o t  a brief explanation , a Durbin-Watson statistic is calculated on the 
residuals using the formula in Chart 2 .  Tllls value is then compared to 
the critical values in the box-sketch , according to whi ch or the several 
possible regions i t  falls in. The regional boundaries are ' delimited 
beforehand on the basis ot sample size and number of independent variables. 
:J.'he two "regions or indet erminacy" are the elements o t  this t est whi ch 
d etract from its precision. Furthermore , the ass1llllption o r  our null 
hypothesi s that no autocorrelation eXists is a rather heroic one .  I n  
tac t ,  the hi story o f  e conomic time series i s  rather explicit i n  that auto-
correlation i s ,  most generally 11the rule rather than the exception tor 
economi c statis tic a . 1130 Nevert heless, the as sumption ot no autocorrelation, 
absurd as it i s ,  is prompted by the necessity o t  constructing a paradigm 
tor comparison with the Durbin-Watson test stati sti c .  In any case , the 
Durbin-Watson statistic computed tor thi s model was 1. 24 ,  whi ch telli into 
the region of indeterminacy adjacent to the lower bounds barrier dL. 
29 �· · pp . 413-416 .  
30 D. G. Champernowne ,  Unc ertainty and Estimation in Economi c s ,  vol. II 
( San Francisco , 1969 ) ,  p. 292. 
d-va lues 
at 1 %  
Si gni ficance 
Level 
30 
Chart 2 
The Durbin-Watson Test for Autocorrelation 
f 
I • 
' 
f 
' I 
l . f6 2 . 54 
I 
2 I du 4-du 
' ' 
0 1. 18 
I 
d '  L 
' 
I I I 
I I 
I 
I 
2 . 82 
4-d
,. 
Accept 1 
I 
Hypothesis • 
Re gion , Accept 1 
o f  1 Null I, Region Accept 
Indeterminacy ' Hypothesi s 1 I 1 
o f 
Indeterminacy Hypothesis 
I 
I I 
Null Hypothesis : No autocorrelation exists 
Hypothesis l :  Positive autocorrelation exists 
Hypothesis 2 :  Ne gative autocorrelation exists 
Region o t  Indeterminacy : Test for autocorrelation is inconc luei.ve 
d ( Durbin-Watson statistic ) = 0. 956 
Va lues tor dL and du are given for the sample size 
Formula for cal�ulating d . statistic: 
n 2 
� 
" < •t - 8t- 1 ) t=z 
•source : Edward J. Kane , Economi c Stati stics and Econometri cs ( Evanston , 
1968 ) , p .  367 . 
2 
4 
3 1 
Although one cannot , therefore , categorically rej ect the null hypothesis,  
in all  fairness it must be admitted that this calculated Durbin-Watson 
value liel suspiciously close to the critical value given by the sketch 
for the lower limit ( dL = 1. 18 ) .  Since we have already disparaged our 
null hypothesis ( i . e . , no autocorrelation eXists) as being of spurious 
• 
authenticity , then the close proximity ot these two values does nothing 
to diminish our prior distrust .  ' Undoub ted}Jr, there is some structure 
present or positive time-related residuals, but we cannot determine 
the degree o f  its seriousness precisely.  
Table 2 reports the results obtained by substituting the rate on 
corporate Aaa bonds for our model ' s  market rate for the same time series 
above . Hare , the money supply variable ( MON ) was observed to be ot 
greater explanatory power with respect to the dependent variable 
in Step 1 .  Note that the R2 value was only . 572 at this point . But 
with the inclusion of the SPRD variable ( spread between market rate and 
maximum Regulatio� Q rate )  in Step 2 ,  the R2 value makes a sizeable jump 
up to . 767 , an increase of . 195 or about 25% from the step 1 R2 value . 
Thus , the market rate proxy used in this model, the corporate Aaa bond 
rat e ,  also evidenced signi ficant inf luence on the change in the volume ot 
outstanding CD • � although not as much as. the commercial paper rate 
used in the previous model. The T-values tor this =odel were observed 
to be significant at the .01 level,  as was the final F-value at the . 001 
level.  The signs o r  the regression coe fficients were ne gative , as expected. 
The Durbin-Watson statistic was 1 . 36 and fell into the re gion of indeter-
minacy previously discussed.  
Table 2a li sts the simple correlation coefficients for each vari-
able pair. As before , we are interested in the coefficient whi ch relates 
our two independent variables.  The relevant variable pair to inspect 
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Tab le 2 Results · 
Step 1 
• 
Step 2 
CD• s  = 108 . 76 11 - 0 . 4624 MON 
(-6. 1188 ) •  
F-value � 37 . 4393+ 
standard Error or Estimate � 3 . 078 
CD's = 8 5 . 42 46 - 4 . 9047 SPRD - o . 3317 MON 
( - 4998 2 ) •  ( -5 . 4097 ) •  
R2 a: . 767 
Increase in R2 = . 19 5  
F-value • 47 . 2437 
Standard -Error or Estimate a 2 . 2 59 
T-va lues are denoted by parentheses 
• Indicates si gnificance at . 01 level 
+ Indicates si gnificance at . 001 level 
Durbin-Watson Statistic • 1.36 
Variable 
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Table 2a : Simple Correlation Coe f ficients 
Simple 
Variable Pairs Corre lation Coe fficients 
• 
1 t 1 
1 . 2  
1 , 3 
2 . 2  
2 . 3 
3 , 3 
= SPRD 
1 . 000 
0 . 426 
-0 . 733 
1 . 000 
-0. 756 
1 . 000 
Variable 2 • MON 
Variable 3 • CD 
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i s  11 1 , 2 11 ,  and its corre sponding magnitude is 0 . 426 .  'l'hia va lue 1 a  cer­
tainly low enough to preclude any suggestion o t  aerioua multicollineari t7 
existing. 
Prev:l.ously , I contended that the Federal Reverve • s  restrictive 
mone tary policy was a contributing factor in the crisis o t  1960. 'l'hia 
contention seems �o be especially borna out in the repults obtained from 
Table 2 . A keener understanding and appreciation o t  the role played by 
monetary policy is reflected in Table 3. Scrupulous exami.nation o f  the 
diverging monetary growth rates tor M1 and M2 tor each ot the selected 
time periods gives some indi cation as to the adverse e ffect ot Regulation 
Q on investment opportunities. For example , in 1969, when market 
ra tes tar surpa ssed the legal maxima of Regulation Q ,  the growth rate 
ot the M2 aggregate declined drastically from a rate of 9 . 8  percent in 
January 1969 to a barely changing O . l percent in February 1070. This 
i s  the lo gi cal behavior we should expe ct since holders ot �ime deposits 
wi ll grav:l. tate qui te rationally toward hi gher available returns tor their 
money ( namely ,  market instruments ) by shitting out of time deposits to 
the more attra.c tive opportunities in the unrestricted marketplace . 
In contrast , but also j ust as we should predict , the process was 
reversed in 1970 when market rates dec lined and fell below the Re gulation 
Q cei lings . The rates on time deposits once again became preferred , as 
they were now the highest rates o f  return to be found by the inve stor. 
Accordingly , the table shows a sudden jump in the M2 aggregate in 1970, 
whi le M1 lost some ot the momentum it had bui lt up during 1969 . More 
wi l l  be said in my concluding remarks about this vaci llating phenomenon 
between M1 and M2 • 
Tables 4 and 4a , and 5 and 5a ,  report the results o f  the model 
when applied to the "credit crunch" of 1966. The market interest ratea 
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Table 3 
Monetary Growth Rates• 
Rate of Change ( Per cent per year) 
Period Ml M2 
January 1967 to January 1969 7.6  9.8  
January 1969 to July 1969 . 5 . 1  3.g  
July 1969 t o  February 1970 1 . 2 0 . 1  
February 1970 t o  August 1970 7.3 9 . 8  
August 1970 to January 1971 3 .5 10. 4  
• Data for this tub le ori ginally came from t he Federal Reserve Bank of 
st . Lolli s ,  while the table itself was obta1.ned from a March i .  1971 
Newsweek article by Professor Milton Friedman and then reprinted here • 
• 
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on commercial paper and corporate Aaa bonds were introduced into Tablea 
4 and 5 respectively. 
It seems clear from the results o f  both ot these tables that this 
particular model does not accurately describe the events that transpired 
during the 1966 crisis. R2 values for Tables 4 and 5 were .300 and . 275 
• 
respectively , well below any value that mi ght reasonably be considered 
for acceptability. The money supply variable was the first to be generated 
in both regressions but evi.denced aittle explanatory power o f  its own. 
T-value tor this variable were si gni ficant at the . os level this time. 
The SPRD variab le was not signi ficant at this level . F-values could not 
attain signi ficanc e until the critical level was raised to . 10.  The 
Durbin-Watson statistics both fell below the lower boundar;r ( dL) i llus-
trated in Chart 2 ,  thus implying that positive autocorrelation among 
succesGiVe residuals was present . Data contained in Tables 4a and 5a 
revealed that the problem o f  multicollinearity between the' independent 
variables was not a serious one . 
• 
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Table 4 Results 
Step 1 • 
Step 2 
CD ' s = - 1 1 . 9547 + 0 . 1 698 MON 
( 2 . 2 458 ) •  
R2 • . 2 40 
F-value • :s . 0435+ 
Standard Error of Estimate a 0 . 878 
CD ' s  = - 1 8 . 3323 - 0 . 6 520 SPRD + 0 . 2073 MON 
( - 1 . 1377 ) ( 2 . 53326 ) •  
R2 = . 300 
Increase 1n R2 • . 060 
F-value • 3 . 2 1 53+ 
Standard Error of Estimate • =  0 . 870 
T-values are deno ted by parentheses 
• Indi c ates signi ficance at . o s  level 
+ I ndicate s  signi ficance at . 1 0  level 
Durbin-Watson Statistic � . 292 
Variable 
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Table 4a : Simple Correlation Coetticients 
Simple · 
Variable Pairs Correlation Coe fticienta 
• 
1 ' 1  
1 , 2 
1 , 3 
2 , 2  
2 , 3 
3 , 3  
= SPRD 
1 . 000 
0 . 402 
-0 . 028 
1 . 000 
0. 490 
1 . 000 
Variable 2 = MON 
Variable 3 = CD 
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'l'able 5 Results 
• 
Step 1 
Step 2 
'l'-values are denoted by parentheses 
CD 1 s  a - 1 1 . 9547 + 0. 1 698 MON 
( 2 . 2458 ) •  
R2 • . 240 
F-value = 5.0436 + 
Standard Error o� Estimate • 0. 878 
CD • s .·-• -7 . 9059 - 0 . 6369 SPRI> + 0. 1 448 MOB 
(-0. 851 7 )  ( 1 . 7721 ) 
R2 a . 275 
Increase in R2 = .035 
F-value = 2 . 84 1 3  
Standard Error of  Estimate = 0. 886 
• I ndicates signi ficance at . 05 level 
+ Indicates si gni ficance at . 1 0  level . 
Durbin-Watson Statistic = . 404 
,. 
Variable 
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Table Sa : Simple Correlation Coefficients 
Simple 
Variable Paire Correlation Co effi cients 
• 
1 , 1 
1 ' 2  
1 , 3  
2 , 2  
2 , 3  
3 ,3 
= SPRD 
1 . 000 
-0.359 
-0.351  
1 . 000 
0. 490 
1 .000 
Variable 2 = MON 
Variable 3 = CD 
• 
Part IV 
The foregoing discussion of both the theoretical and empirical 
• 
impli.cations of Regulation Q on the conduct of moneta17 policy 
invites a few conclusions and recommendations. 
First o f  all , it se ems clear that the results obtained from 
the 1969 crisis convincingly at�est to our theoretical proposition 
that a si gnificant spread between higher market interest rates and 
lower bank cei li.ng rates will elicit a distorted investment pic�ure 
in the financial sector. The larger the spread becomes and the longer 
it is allowed to persist , the more massive seem s  to be the disinter-
mediation phenom enon. This does not appear to have been the case 
w:L th the ,_1966 "cred:L t crunch. "  For one , it was only o f  relatively 
short duration--about four to five months. Also , market rates did no� 
ascend to a hei ght , vis-a-vis the .Reg11lation Q rates , which would have 
establi shed them as irresistable investment opportunities. Clearly, 
the precipitate halt in the growth in the money supply at that time 
i s  the most important explanation for the sudden j ump in market rates 
and the unfortunate crunch whi ch fo llowed . 
A second conclusion which emerges is that the Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors must exercise due caution in their compilation and 
forecasting activities when such situations as that in 1969 crop up 
again. For the M1 and M2 monetary aggregates most likely will be in an 
abnormal state of flux and will further be characterized by something 
other than their tradi tionally reliable positive correlation. The M2 
aggregate in particular seems acutely susceptible to rather large 
41 
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short-run changes in magnitude . 
Some preventive economic medi cine surely is desirable in order 
that Regulation Q not be a llowed to impair the stability and confidence 
o f  the financial sector. More to the point . I believe a strong case 
can be made tor the outright aboli tion ot Regulation Q, tor it seems to 
• 
b e  yet another instance o f  an antiquated remnant o f  depression-oriented 
e conomics that has managed to endure through the years into a new era 
where economic conditions are obeervedly different. I t  has long s1.nce 
outlived its use fulness ( wh:Lch was basically that of a psycholo gical 
paci fier) and we would now do well to divest ourselves o f  ita potentiall.l' 
inimical influence .  
The first obj ection to Regulation Q that I have repeatedly stressed 
is the di fficulty encountered in assessing the "stance of monetary policy" 
when the monetary a ggregates are in a state of flwc. I have dwe lled on 
this aspect of the problem enough already and do not think . i t  necessary 
to review i t  again. Suffice it to say that the Fed can resolve this 
problem by either e liminating Regulation Q a ltogether or ensuring that 
its rate structure remains competitive with current market interest rates. 
Of course . the latter a lternative will still require the Fed to maintain 
a constant responsibility and vi gi lance over the structure of interest 
rates that would not be necessary otherwise. 
Secondly , the impact on tinancial intermediaries such as savings 
and loan associations , similarly regulated by legal statute , may also 
be debilitating. Small savers ,  who do not possess the knowledge of un-
re gulated market opportunities or the ability to transla�e such know-
ledge into practice , are forced to forego the hi gher prospective returns 
from the hi gher interest-bearing market instruments. On the other hand, 
• 
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those savers with large holdings and the knack for financial wheeling 
and dealing can exploit the situation. From the intermediary ' s  point 
of view, high market rates leave them at a distinct disadvantage in 
attracting deposits and thereby effecting loans. In the· particular 
case of savings and loan associations the e ffect may be quite discrimin-
• 
31 atory to growth in the housing industry.  Most people are familiar 
wi.th the pathetic promotional strategems that some hard-pressed institu-
tions were forced to employ as a consequence of high market rates in 
order to attract depositors. Trafficking in transistor radios, portable 
t elevision sets,  and Apollo XII moon glasses is hardly becoming of an7 
financial institution. 
Thirdly , there is no evidence that the absence of Regulation Q 
would pitch the banking system into chaos .  The economy has managed 
quita nicely in the past when Regulation Q had only a negli gible e ffect 
on monetary conditions . The Federal Reserve System can surely desi gn 
some e ffective contingency plans to protect member bank credit conditions 
in emergency situations . Deliberate price-ti�ng o f  this type can be 
circumvented rather efficiently. 
In closing then, I fee l that the historical, theoretical,  and 
empirical record of Re gulation Q does not recommend itself well for 
the task to which it was supposedly intended--namely,  to give the 
banking system legally imposed pr�tection from the vagaries of the 
monetary system . Instead, it only serves to prostrate the banking sys-
tem be fore the discretion O f  the Federal Reserve Board o r  Governors , 
who may have many conflictine priority assignmente at AD)' one time. I 
feel the banking system should be relieved of tld.s artit�cial constraint 
31 Ruebling,  p. 40. 
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and allowed to fend tor itself in the open market as much as possible . 
I t  is certainly well equi.pped to do so . Money market conditions will 
then re flect the true posture o f  the monetary sector to our policy-
makers , who can then engage in the appropriate policy directives on a 
much more simpli fi ed foundation. Failing this , the Fed should make 
• 
the maxi.mum effort to maintai.n a level of competitive parity between 
the bank ceiling rates and the free market rates in order not to en-
courage the sort o r  injurious rate discrepanc7 that prompted the l�g 
di sintermediation cri sis.  
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